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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

9287

PAUL L. NELSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of
facts as far as it goes. although it appears unduly detailed and to contain a great amount of irrelevant matter. However, there is considerable other evidence that
should come to the attention of the Court in order
that it not be afforded only an incomplete and slanted
picture of the case, one highly favorable to appellant.
Respondent deems it more orderly procedure to
set out the necessary additional facts in the course of
its argument rather than in a separate statement of
facts at this point. This will avoid repetition and unnecessary imposition upon the time of the Court.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFEND AN T ' S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NO.8.
POINT II.
NO ERROR OCCURRED IN THE JUDGE'S
CHARGE TO THE JURY TO DISREGARD
THE TESTIMONY OF THE S T ATE
CHEMIST.
POINT III.
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IN N 0
WAY VIOLATED EITHER THE UNITED
STATES OR STATE CONSTITUTION.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFEND A N T . S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NO.8.
It is true that the instruction requested by appellant has at times been given in U tab cases.
As appellant says, it was used in State v. Burch~
100 Utah 414, 115 P. 2d 911. That case, however,
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differed radical! y from the one at hand in that all of
the evidence there was circumstantial. Proof of this
is the statement of the court at page 9 12 :
''The present case is out of the ordinary in
that there is not one ultimate fact necessary for
a conviction that is substantiated by direct evidence. * * *"
In this case, on the other hand, there is abundant direct
evidence that defendant did considerable drinking prior
to the accident, and this, coupled with the circumstantial evidence present, certain! y was sufficient to prove
his drunken condition.
Appellant relies heavily on the case of Utah Farm
Bureau Insurance Company v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399,
315 P. 2d 2 7 7. He takes from the con text thereof this
statement: "The fact that there was an empty bottle
in the car and the smell of liquor are not sufficient to
support a finding of intoxication" in an effort to support his theory about circumstantial evidence and the
necessity of giving the requested instruction.
There was, of course, much evidence in this case
additional to the smell of alcohol. A careful reading of
the facts of the Chugg case shows it is not in point and
cannot serve as much help in deciding this one. There
the defendant had been rendered unconscious by the
accident and was in pronounced shock. Here defendant was not knocked unconscious and, as he points
out in his brief at page 15, was not hurt in the crash.
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In the C hugg case the officer testified, ''From the
smell, I imagine he had been drinking quite a bit.''
(Italics ours.) The court observed that the officer had
seen defendant for only about a minute altogether, and
did not see him walk at all. In making a point of this,
the court seems to have opened the door in this case to
testimony of the appearance of defendant's walk as
being proper evidence as to intoxication.
The apparent doctrine in the quotation appellant takes from the Burch decision (A. B. 17), if in
fact it really meant what appellant contends, seems to
have been watered down somewhat in later decisions.
And, incidentally, the facts of the Burch case constitute
just about as poor a case for the prosecution as can be
imagined.
In the two cases cited by appellant himself, the
court seems to limit the obligation of giving the instruction desired by appellant to a circumstance involving no direct evidence, as shown in the following statement: "where the proof of a necessary fact is dependent solely upon circumstantial evidence, such circumstances must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the existence of such fact and be
inconsistent with its existence and inconsistent with its
nonexistence.'' (Emphasis ours.) State V. Erwin, 101
Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285 at p. 302. and State v. Anderson, 66 Utah 573, 158 P. 2d 127, at page 130.
The use of the term "solely" is important in this
case because here. as previously stated, there was conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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siderable other evidence, direct evidence, indicating the
fact of intoxication, and its existence did not rest upon
circumstantial evidence alone.
The short concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe
in the Burch case is enlightening and _useful. There he
states:
··I concur in the result. I do so in the belief that there was no substantial evidence to
show the defendant's participation in the alleged
offense to warrant the submission of the matter
to the jury. However, I do not agree in the
views indicating that circumstantial evidence is
to be considered by a jury in a different and
more restricted light than is direct evidence.
There are cases where the set of circumstances
may be stronger than much direct evidence which
could be adduced. In the dovetailing of circumstantial evidence criminal prosecutions may ofttimes be made equally as strong and convincing
as in the use of direct evidence. Juries and trial
courts should not be required to view it as
weaker evidence which must 'exclude the hypothesis of innocence.' We should rest content
with a rule that if a jury has no reasonable
doubts about the guilt of a man, taking into
consideration all competent evidence, it may
convict, without including in opinions expressions which may be seized upon to confuse and
confound the ordinary jury whose task is at
best a difficult one.''
In the Anderson case, Justice Wolfe again concurs with the result, but discusses the question of reasonable hypothesis as follows:
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"I concur but I call attention to the inclusion in the opinion of the quotation from
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285,
302. I think the first and last sentence of that
quotation helpful. The middle part of the quotation stating that the 'circumstances must be
such as to reasonably exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than the existence of such fact
and be consistent with its existence and inconsistent with its non-existence' is too abstruse for
the ordinary jury, and from my experience has
even misled judges to withhold from the jury
cases which should properly have been submitted. I paid my respect to this sort of a test
in my concurring opinion in the case of State v.
Burch~ 100 Utah 414, 115 P. 2d 911, at page
913.
"My objection is not that the test, proper1y understood and used, is not a valid one. ln
certain cases where the circumstances as to each
necessary element of the crime are not of themselves anywhere near compelling as to such element, but when taken with those other transactions which give color or lend interpretation and
also interlock and reinforce other groups of circumstances relating to other transactions in the
history of the events which it is alleged constitute a critne, so that from the w l1ole a definite
conclusion of guilt may or may not be drawn,
it may be wise to instruct the jurymen in such
fashion as to cause them to parade before their
minds all possibly reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence as a method of deliberation. Such a case was State v. Laub, 102 Utah
402, 131 P. 2d 805. But even under the facts
of that case I believe that less confusion would
arise frotn the giving of an instruction that if
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from all the circumstances the jury had no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendants,
they could find them guilty; that if all the circumstances pointed concurringly to the guilt of
the defendants so as to remove all doubts
founded on reason, they would be justified in
finding the defendants guilty.
"The main objection to the test that the
evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis lies in the phrase 'reasonable hypotheses.' It invites the jurymen and indeed judges
(see State v. Bruno, 97 Utah 17, 85 P. 2d
79 5), to conjure up in their imaginations every
sort of hypothesis which may be fitted into the
evidence and then in the process of discarding
some and retaining others the test of reasonableness is applied with great variation as to
their judgment as to what is reasonable. Often
in determining whether a particular explanation is or is not reasonable, judges in vade the
province of the jury and I fear that the method
of taking up all possible hypotheses which the
evidence permits and then sifting out the reasonable from the unreasonable, those terms depending of course on the judgment of the judges,
leads to such invasion.
"It is odd how some abstract statement
applicable when first devised as a test on the
facts then in evidence persists down through
the years to become an incubus on the law.
There is no use of inflicting on a judge and
much less on a jury a test which says that where
a fact rests on circumstantial evidence alone the
'circumstances must be such as to reasonbly exclude [''in every reasonable mind" should I
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suppose be supplied] every reasonable hypothesis other than the existence of such fact,' etc.
" ..fhe simple test is: 'Under all the evidence in this case can I as a judge say that no
normal functioning mind applying its reasoning faculties to the evidence in the case could
conclude that the defendant was guilty.' If so
it must be withdrawn from the jury. If the
judge has doubt as to that it should go to the
jury with the instruction that it, the jury, must
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to
defendant's guilt before it should find him
guilty. These are comparatively simple testsalbeit they do depend on the experience and capacity of the minds of the fact finders, a human
element of uncertainty we cannot escape from.
There are no absolutes in the human mind. We
have no robots into which we can feed evidence,
and turn a crank and get the exact, correct and
perfect result. All that can be expected is human
justice-that which emerges from not infallible
and imperfect human beings even after every attempt to be fair and apply to the utmost their
comparatively
frail and limited human facul. ,,
t1es.
In State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P. 2d 805,
the court made this statement:
"While the State's evidence is circumstantial, such evidence may be just as conclusive or
even more so than direct evidence, but the prosecution still has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.

* * *"
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At T. 87 Warren Haddenham, an ambulance
driver, referred to a conversation involving defendant
and Trooper Schmidt in which defendant said he had
drunk two or three schooners of beer and two vodkas
and a whiskey. On the following page, under cross
examination, Haddenham said that defendant had
mentioned he had gone to a bar for drinks prior to the
accident.
At T. 106 Deputy Marshall Gwynn testified
that defendant, in answer to Trooper Schmidt's question, said he had gone to the Ashtonian beer parlor for
three schooners of beer, and that he also had a couple
of drinks of whiskey and a drink of vodka at another
place. At T. 109 under cross examination, Gwynn
said the Justice of the Peace had asked defendant how
much he had drunk, and that defendant said he had
several drinks-four or five drinks.
At T. 135, North Salt Lake Town Marshall,
Royal A. Reynolds, testified:
"He wasn't sure; it varied anywhere from
two to four or five schooners of beer, two shots
of vodka, and some whiskey. He wasn't definitely sure on how much whiskey."
At T. 180 Justice of the Peace E. S. Arbuckle
said he had talked with defendant and asked him if
he had been drinking, and that defendant said yes.
''* * * and I asked him how much, and he said
two beers, a vodka and some whiskey." After some
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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further conversation Arbuckle then testified he again
asked defendant "How many did you say you had?
And he said 'I had about four beers and two or three
vodkas', that time."
At T. 219 defendant himself testified to having
drunk three beers at a tavern and at T. 220~ said he
drank some vodka later at the home of a friend.
In circumstances such as existed in the Burch case
where there was no direct evidence and the State's
case had to ride or fall on circumstantial evidence alone,
the instruction requested might be appropriate. However, such is not the situation here because of the abundance of direct evidence.
If the court were to adopt defendant's theory that
whenever the evidence indicates a ''reasonable hypothesis'' of innocence, the case should not be allowed to
go to the jury at all (A. B. 17), normal criminal practice would indeed be stifled and perhaps eventually
destroyed. Any defendant could be expected to conjure up evidence of such nature as to constitute a prima
facie "reasonable hypothesis" of innocence and the
State's case vvould automatically dissolve. This should
not be the law in Utah.
In addition, a defendant in a civil case is not entitled as a matter of right to have instructions given
in his own words where the applicable law is set forth
in substance otherwise. The proper law, as applied
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to the facts of this case, was adequately covered by the
instructions actually given by the Court, and particularly by Nos. 2, 5, 11, 15 and 17. Thus, the Court
committed no error. Even if it should be held that
error did occur, however, it could not be considered
prejudicial under all the circumstances, since the jury
was fully apprised that each and every allegation had
to be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

POINT II.
NO ERROR OCCURRED IN THE JUDGE'S
CHARGE TO THE JURY TO DISREGARD
THE TESTIMONY OF THE S T A T E
CHEMIST.
Admittedly the State Chemist did not attempt
to tell the Court what effect certain amounts of alcohol
in various body fluids would have upon the conduct
of an individual, nor did the State produce medical
testimony to this effect. On the basis of this, the Court
gave Instruction No. 9 (R. 29), reproduced at page
21 of appellant's brief. The instruction is identical
vvith appellant's requested Instruction No. 4 (R. 17).
It reads as follows:
"You are instructed that, though there is
evidence regarding the results of a chemical test
of the defendant's bodily fluids, to wit, urine,
if there is no evidence of the effect of that percentage or any other percentage of alcohol in the
blood by weight upon the human being, you
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must disregard the results of the chemical test
which has been received in evidence."
Respondent believes that this instruction fully
protects appellant's rights and that it precludes the
occurrence of any error that might otherwise have
arisen in the jury's considering the State Chemist's testimony as to the results of his examination of appellant's urine.
If there is any weakness at all in the instruction,
it exists only in the use of the single word ''if" at line
4 as the instruction appears at page 21 of appellant's
brief. It was however fully adequate to convince the
jury that since no medical testimony of the effect of
alcohol on the body was before it, it could not proceed
to consider evidence of the alcoholic content of body
fluids. This instruction alone fully protected appellant's rights and no others were needed. We do not
believe that the instruction is error. If it is, however,
it was self-induced by appellant and he can take no
comfort from his mistake.
Appellant now urges "palpable" error and asks
that on the strength of State v. Coho, 90 Utah 89,
60 P. 2d 952, the Court disregard the long established
rule of this jurisdiction that errors regarding instructions will not be considered on appeal unless exceptions
are taken at trial.
The Coho doctrine, however, is to be invoked
only in capital cases and in cases of grave and serious
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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offenses carrying long terms of imprisonment; (See
page 958 and only where proper determination of the
issues would otherwise be denied). State v. Peterson,
121 Utah 229, 240 P. 2d 504.
This, of course, is not such a case in either sense.
It is not a capital case nor is it grave or serious in comparison with other felonies in this jurisdiction, the sentence being only for a period of from one to ten years,
nor was appellant denied a fair trial by virtue of the
instructions given.
Appellant comes to a strange conclusion in seemingly urging error in the Court's failure to give an instruction advising the jury of certain presumptions
dealing with intoxication according to amounts of alcohol in the blood. These presumptions are given only
in Section 41-6-44, U. C. A. 1953, 1959 Supp. (A.
B. 22), and do not deal with the crime charged, except
perhaps by analogy. There was no occasion for an
instruction dealing with these presumptions. They
relate to the crime of driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor or drug-a completely different
charge than that here, automobile homicide.
Appellant expresses a fanciful theory at page 23
of his brief, in urging that, had the presumptions been
outlined for the Court, his chances for acquittal would
have been improved. Not only were the presumptions
not relevant to the crime charged at all, but in addition,
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he indulges in mindreading and speculation in guessing
at the jury's conclusion.
Appellant is mistaken in saying there was palpable error, and expects entirely too much under all the
circumstances, in urging reversal for failure to give an
instruction not asked for, especially when Instruction
9 fully protects him.
POINT III.
APPELLANT~S

CONVICTION IN N 0
WAY VIOLATED EITHER THE UNITED
STATES OR STATE CONSTITUTION.
Appellant interprets the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Sections 7 and
12 of }\rticle I of the Constitution of Utah as prohibitions against compelling a defendant to give evidence
against himself, which, as an abstract proposition, may
be true.
Respondent is unable, however, to find from a
careful search of the transcript any exercise of compulsion whatsoever at any stage of the case, beginning at
the time of the accident. In the total absence of any
evidence that defendant was compelled to give evidnce
Jgainst himslf, it is unnecessary to go into the constitutional question.
Appellant complains that the record does not
show evidence of any statement made to him by the
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Justice of the Peace as to his constitutional right to
remain silent. Occasionally, of course, records do not
reflect everything which occurs in lower courts; nor
is it common for testimony given in District Court
trials to bring out everything which happened before
the Justice of the Peace. Moreover, courts on appeal
will presume, in the absence of a clear showing to the
contrary, that proceedings prior to trial were in all
respects regular.
Appellant has completely failed to bring forth
any evidence to substantiate his inference (A. B. 24),
and in the absence of such evidence, it must be presumed that the Justice acted properly and that he apprised defendant of his legal rights. It cannot be presumed to the contrary. If appellant had offered any
evidence at all to back up his allegation, the state could
have been expected to meet it. But there was no occasion for doing so. See State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228
Pac. 563.
Even assuming that the Justice's questioning of
appellant was somewhat unusual under the circumstances, still it was not prejudicial to him in light of
the abundance of other evidence sufficient in and of
itself to prove his guilt, and in light of his total failure
to take the legal procedural steps available to him at
the trial.
Mr. Arbuckle had no official role in the trial
of the crime charged, except to serve as a witness (R.
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1). He had only issued a commitment on a charge
that was dropped, and did nothing at all as to the preliminary hearing or anything else connected with the
charge of automobile homicide. As to appellant's
statement (A. B. 25) that the magistrate must tell a
defendant the charges against him, (and we believe
that Mr. Arbuckle did his duty) there can be no prejudice here even if he did not since Mr. Arbuckle testified (T. 180) that during the informal proceeding
before him the arresting officer, in the presence of appellant, said he had charged him with "drunken driv. '' .
tng
The alleged error really relates to the matter of
admissibility of appellant's admissions to the Justice
of the Peace and not to the question of being compelled
to testify against himself. Neither he nor counsel raised
any objection whatsoever to the introduction of the
testimony of Mr. Arbuckle as to the admissions made
by appellant. In failing to do so, appellant waived any
right to raise the matter on appeal.
It is important to note, in addition, that even if
error occurred in the act of the Justice of the Peace
eliciting from appellant statements as to his drinking,
such evidence resulted in no prejudice to him inasmuch
as he himself testified at some length upon trial ( T.
219-2 2 0) as to the facts of his drinking, thus making
his objections moot under the circumstances.
In claiming prejudicial error appellant relies to a
great extent on the case of State v. Assenberg, 66 Utah
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573, 244 Pac. 1027. That case, however, is readily
distinguished from this one in several particulars.
There, the defendant was a juvenile, age 19, without
knowledge of his legal rights, who had been held in
jail for nearly four days. Here the defendant was a
mature man, a truck driver presumably cognizant of
driving laws and the probable consequences to him of
death or injury caused by driving negligently and under influence of alcohol, a man who had not been held
in jail at all prior to going before the Justice of the
Peace. He merely had freely assented to go with the
officers to the hospital and then voluntarily accompanied them to the residence of the Justice of the Peace.
No coercion of any kind was exercised upon him at
any time.
Appellant urges error in the circumstances surrounding his visit with the officers to St. Mark's Hospital and their suggestions that he might desire to submit to a blood test.
The fact that he refused repeatedly to take a
blood test is, in and of itself, clear proof that he was
not coerced into giving evidence against himself. He
refused and that was all there was to it. No brutal
methods were used and in fact no force, violence or
threats were brought to bear. Since he did not take
the test, everything complained of by appellant at page
27 of his brief is pointless and moot. The Ringwood
case (A. B. 27) is completely aside from the point. As
to the urine test, appellant took it voluntarily.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
For the record, however, it should be noted at T.
85 that Mr. Haddenham testified that Trooper
Schmidt informed Defendant that the blood test could
be used for him or against him, and that it would
either free him or convict him.
It is not entirely clear how much or which phases
of the questioning of appellant counsel now objects to
as error. At page 24 of his brief, he seems to cast some
doubt upon the right of peace officers to interrogate
a defendant prior to his being taken before a magistrate. This, of course, is not a valid argument, as is
shown by the holding of this Court in State v. Braasch,
119 Utah 450, 229 P. 2d 289, where a defendant gave
a complete statement at his first interview with the
peace officers.
Since it is clear that neither the Justice of the
Peace nor any peace officers concerned exercised any
coercion whatsoever upon appellant, his third point is
to no avail.
CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as the court below committed no prejudicial error, and in light of the statutes and cases cited,
respondent urges that this appeal be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,

Attorney General,
VERNON B. ROMNEY,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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